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 INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 
 The Cato Institute was established in 1977 as a nonpartisan public policy 
research foundation dedicated to advancing the principles of individual liberty, free 
markets, and limited government.  Cato’s Center for Constitutional Studies was 
established in 1989 to promote the principles of limited constitutional government 
that are the foundation of liberty.  Toward those ends, Cato publishes books and 
studies, conducts conferences, and publishes the annual Cato Supreme Court 
Review.  It also files amicus briefs with the courts, including in cases focusing on 
the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause such as United States 
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), and 
United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010).  The present case centrally 
concerns Cato because it represents the federal government’s most egregious 
attempt to exceed its constitutional powers. 
 Randy E. Barnett is the Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory at 
the Georgetown University Law Center.  Prof. Barnett has taught constitutional 
law, contracts, and criminal law, among other subjects, and has published more 
than 90 articles and reviews, as well as eight books.  His book, Restoring the Lost 
Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty (Princeton, 2004), and other scholarship 
concerns the original meaning of the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses 
                                                 
1 Pursuant to Rule Fed. R. App. P. 29, both the Plaintiffs and the Defendants, 
through their respective counsel, have consented to the filing of this brief. 
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 and their relationship to the powers enumerated in the Constitution.  His 
constitutional law casebook, Constitutional Law: Cases in Context (Aspen 2008), 
is widely used in law schools throughout the country.  In 2004 he argued Gonzales 
v. Raich in the Supreme Court.  In 2008, he was awarded a Guggenheim 
Fellowship in Constitutional Studies. 
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The individual mandate goes beyond Congress’s power to regulate interstate 
commerce under existing doctrine.  The outermost bounds of the Supreme Court’s 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence—the “substantial effects doctrine”—prevent 
Congress from reaching intrastate non-economic activity regardless of whether it 
substantially affects interstate commerce.  Nor under existing law can Congress 
reach inactivity even if it purports to act pursuant to a broader regulatory scheme.   
That is, as the court below recognized, “in every Commerce Clause case 
presented thus far, there has been some sort of activity. In this regard, the Health 
Care Reform Act arguably presents an issue of first impression.” Thomas More 
Law Center v. Obama, 720 F. Supp.2d 882, 893 (E.D. Mich. 2010).   What 
Congress is attempting to do here is quite literally unprecedented. 
“The government has never required people to buy any good or service as a 
condition of lawful residence in the United States.”  Cong. Budget Office, The 
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 Budgetary Treatment of an Individual Mandate to Buy Health Insurance 1 (1994).  
Nor has it ever said that every man and woman faces a civil penalty for declining 
to participate in the marketplace.  And never before have courts had to consider 
such a breathtaking assertion of raw power under the Commerce Clause.  Even in 
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 11 (1942), the federal government claimed “merely” 
the power to regulate what farmers grew, not to mandate that people become 
farmers, much less to force people to purchase farm products.  Even if not 
purchasing health insurance is considered an “economic activity”—which of 
course would mean that every aspect of human life is economic activity—there is 
no legal basis for Congress to require individuals to enter the marketplace to buy a 
particular good or service. 
Amici fully endorse the arguments offered in the appellants’ brief.  We offer 
this brief to highlight the limits on federal power under the Commerce Clause and 
Necessary and Proper Clause and to underscore the necessity of preserving those 
limits in the light of constitutional text, structure, and history.   
 
 3
 ARGUMENT 
I. The Mandate is Unconstitutional Under the “Substantial Effects” 
Doctrine That Defines the Scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause 
in the Context of the Commerce Power 
 
  Since the New Deal, the Supreme Court has asked whether a particular 
“economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce” when considering 
whether it falls under Congress’s Commerce Clause power.  Gonzalez v. Raich, 
545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005) (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 
(2000) (in turn quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995)).  The 
significant New Deal cases, however, found the authority for the “substantial 
effects doctrine” not in the inherent power of the Commerce Clause, but in its 
execution via the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Although prevailing legal 
convention describes the New Deal cases as expanding the definition of 
“commerce,” a closer examination of these decisions shows that the definition of 
“commerce” remained unchanged.  The Court instead asked whether federal 
regulation of the activity in question is a necessary and proper means for exercising 
the power to regulate interstate commerce because the activity substantially affects 
that commerce.  Beyond that point Congress has never been able go. 
  In United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), for example, the Court 
considered the power of Congress to “prohibit the employment of workmen in the 
production of goods ‘for interstate commerce’ at other than prescribed wages and 
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 hours.”  Id. at 105.  Rather than stretching the definition of “commerce,” the Court 
focused on how congressional power “extends to those activities intrastate which 
so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to 
make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, 
the exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.”  
Id.  The authority cited for this proposition did not come from Gibbons v. Ogden, 
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)—the Commerce Clause case which the Court had 
already cited throughout its opinion—but instead from the foundational Necessary 
and Proper Clause case of McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).  
  The Court in Darby makes it apparent that the substantial effects doctrine 
has always rested on the Necessary and Proper Clause.  The “appropriate means to 
the attainment of a legitimate end” language explicitly references Chief Justice 
Marshall’s seminal explanation of the Necessary and Proper Clause:  “Let the end 
be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are 
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but 
consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”  Id. at 
421 (emphasis added).  Moreover, the phrase in Darby, “the exercise of the granted 
power,” 312 U.S. at 105, evokes the language of the Clause itself: “carries into 
execution the foregoing powers.” U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 18. 
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   A year after Darby, in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), the Court 
continued this reasoning—that “commerce” was not being redefined but rather the 
challenged measures were a necessary and proper means for regulating commerce 
as historically understood.  Like Darby, Wickard is explicit in its reliance on the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, citing McCulloch, id. at 130, n.29, as authority for 
congressional power—even if Roscoe Filburn’s personal production of wheat 
“may not be regarded as commerce.”  Id. at 125.  Thus, contrary to the 
conventional academic view, Wickard did not expand the Commerce Clause to 
include the power to regulate intrastate activity that, when aggregated, 
substantially affects interstate commerce.  “Instead, Wickard actually stands for the 
proposition that this intrastate activity can be regulated because the failure to do so 
would impede the government’s ability to regulate the interstate price of wheat by 
restricting supply.”  Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the 
Individual Health Insurance Mandate is Unconstitutional, N.Y.U. J.L.L. 
(forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1680392. 
 Fast forward 50 years, when the Court clarified the substantial effects 
doctrine by confining congressional power under the Commerce and Necessary 
and Proper Clause to the regulation of intrastate economic activity.  Again, as in 
Wickard and Darby, the Court did not redefine “commerce” but only refined its 
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 analysis of whether the means adopted by Congress were necessary and proper to 
the end of regulating commerce. 
 In United States v. Lopez, the Court found that “[e]ven Wickard, which is 
perhaps the most far-reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over 
intrastate activity, involved economic activity in a way that possession of a gun in 
a school zone does not.”  514 U.S. at 560.  Five years later, in United States v. 
Morrison, the Court held that the gender-motivated violence regulated by the 
Violence Against Women Act was not itself economic activity and thus had only 
an “indirect and remote” or “attenuated” effect on interstate commerce.  529 U.S. 
at 608 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556-57 (in turn quoting NLRB v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937))), 615.   
  Chief Justice Rehnquist described the limits of Congress’s power as follows: 
“Where economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation 
regulating that activity will be sustained.”  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 (emphasis 
added).  Conversely, non-economic activity cannot be regulated merely because it 
has “substantial effects on employment, production, transit, or consumption,” or 
indirectly affects interstate commerce through a “but-for causal chain.”  Morrison, 
529 U.S. at 615.  That is because the subject of regulation must have a “close” 
qualitative “relation to interstate commerce,” not merely a substantial 
“quantitative” impact on the national economy.  NLRB, 301 U.S. at 37. 
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   The distinction between economic and non-economic activity allowed the 
Court to determine when it was truly necessary to regulate intrastate commerce 
without engaging in protracted, and arguably impossible, attempts to evaluate the 
“more or less necessity or utility” of a measure.  Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on 
the Constitutionality of a National Bank (February 23, 1791), in Legislative and 
Documentary History of the Bank of the United States 98 (H. St. Clair & D.A. Hall 
eds., reprinted Augustus M. Kelley 1967) (1832).  This Necessary and Proper 
doctrine limits congressional power to regulating intrastate economic activity 
because this category of activity is closely connected to interstate commerce, 
without recognizing an implied federal power that would amount to a federal 
police power that the Supreme Court has always denied existed.  See, e.g., Lopez, 
514 U.S. at 567.  Moreover, a power to regulate intrastate economic activity that 
has a substantial affect on interstate commerce is not so broad as to obstruct or 
supplant the states’ police powers.   
  In other words, to preserve the constitutional scheme of limited and 
enumerated powers, the Court drew a judicially administrable line beyond which 
Congress could not go in enacting “necessary and proper” means to execute its 
power to regulate interstate commerce.  The “substantial effects” doctrine, as 
limited in Lopez and Morrison, thus established the outer doctrinal bounds of 
“necessity” under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  
 8
   Authority for this view can be found in Chief Justice Marshall’s subsequent 
defense of his McCulloch opinion.  Writing as “A Friend of the Constitution,” 
Marshall explained that the constitutionality of congressional acts depend “on their 
being the natural direct and appropriate means, or the known and usual means, for 
the execution of a given power.”  John Marshall’s Defense of McCulloch v. 
Maryland 186 (Gerald Gunter ed., Stanford University Press 1969) (from essay of 
July 5, 1819).  Lopez and Morrison employ that same logic:  Only the regulation of 
intrastate economic activity qualifies as “natural direct and appropriate means, or 
the known and usual means” of executing the commerce power. 
Most recently, in Gonzales v. Raich, the Court found the cultivation of 
marijuana to be an economic activity that Congress could prohibit as a necessary 
and proper exercise of its commerce power.  545 U.S. at 22.  Raich explicitly 
adhered to the economic/non-economic distinction set out in Lopez and Morrison.  
As Justice Stevens wrote for the majority, “Our case law firmly establishes 
Congress’s power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic 
‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”  Id. at 17 
(emphasis added).   The majority in Raich, therefore, reaffirmed that the scope of 
Congress’s power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to execute its commerce 
power is limited to reaching economic activity. 
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 Raich also rejected the government’s contention that it was Angel Raich’s or 
Roscoe Filburn’s non-purchase of a commodity traded interstate that brought their 
personal cultivation under congressional power.  See Barnett, supra, at 18-19.  
Instead, Justice Stevens invoked the Webster’s Dictionary definition of 
“economics”—“the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities,” 
Raich, 545 U.S. at 25—and thus refused to adopt the government’s sweeping 
theory here that non-participation in the marketplace was itself economic activity. 
As Professor Randy Beck has explained, “Given the close relationship 
between intrastate and interstate economic activity, a statute regulating local 
economic conduct will usually be calculated to accomplish an end legitimately 
encompassed within the plenary congressional authority over interstate 
commerce.”  J. Randy Beck, The New Jurisprudence of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, 2002 U. Ill. L. Rev. 581, 625.  In short, regulating intrastate economic 
activity can be a “necessary” means of regulating interstate commerce as that term 
is understood under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  The obvious corollary is 
that regulating non-economic activity cannot be “necessary,” regardless of its 
effect on interstate commerce.  And a power to regulate inactivity is even more 
remote from Congress’s power over interstate commerce. 
In Raich, the Court identified the doctrinal distinction between economic 
and non-economic activity by looking back at all the substantial effects cases it had 
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 previously decided and found that “the pattern is clear.”  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.  
Similarly, the leading Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause 
precedents establish a doctrinal line between activity and inactivity, even if that 
line has heretofore escaped articulation because no precedent has presented the 
distinction as sharply as this case.  Just as Chief Justice Rehnquist did in Lopez 
regarding the economic/non-economic line, therefore, we can examine existing 
case law and find that the individual mandate is unsustainable under existing 
interpretations of congressional power.  
In Wickard, Roscoe Filburn had grown wheat and thus with his own actions 
inserted himself into the realm of economic activity.  Wickard, 317 U.S. at 114-15.  
In NLRB, the Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation was subject to regulatory 
schemes because it engaged in the business of steelmaking.  NLRB, 301 U.S. at 26.  
The Civil Rights Cases concerned parties that operated a restaurant and a hotel, 
respectively.  Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 296 (1964); Heart of Atlanta 
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 243 (1964).  And finally, in Raich, 
Diane Monson and Angel Raich grew, processed, and consumed medicinal 
marijuana.  Raich, 545 U.S. at 7. 
All these cases fall into two general categories.  Raich, 545 U.S. at 35-38 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing the “two general circumstances” in which “the 
regulation of intrastate activities may be necessary to and proper for the regulation 
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 of interstate commerce”—and limits thereto).  First, if someone affirmatively 
places himself into the economic realm by starting a business or participating in 
agriculture, manufacturing, or another commercial endeavor, Congress can 
regulate those activities as a necessary and proper exercise of its power to regulate 
interstate commerce.  This regulation may mandate certain activities—for example, 
recordkeeping, posting workplace regulations, and providing fire extinguishers—
but it never requires someone to start the business or buy a product in the first 
place.  The second category, articulated in Raich, concerns Congress’s regulatory 
attempts to narrow a particular type of commerce, such as that involving drugs.  
This regulation can require individuals to stop engaging in certain activities as a 
necessary and proper means of regulating (or, in this case, limiting) interstate 
commerce.  In other words, Congress can regulate or perhaps even prohibit 
economic acts that substantially affect interstate commerce, but it cannot force 
people to undertake such acts—not even ones that, if voluntarily undertaken, 
would have been subject to regulation. 
With the individual mandate, Congress addressed the requirement that it 
confine itself to regulating economic activity by redefining the word “activity” to 
include “decisions” or even “non-actions.”  Yet the vital limiting principles on 
federal power cannot be brushed away by recourse to the admitted importance of 
reforming health care or the cost-shifting aspects of that market.  There is no 
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 “health care is different” constitutional exemption—and indeed Congress could 
have reformed the health care system in any number of ways that may have been 
better or worse as a matter of policy but would have been legally unassailable.  The 
reason for this lawsuit and dozens of others around the country, however, is that 
the health insurance mandate is supported by no Supreme Court precedent.  As one 
district court recently said while striking down the individual mandate, “Every 
application of Commerce Clause power found to be constitutionally sound by the 
Supreme Court involved some sort of action, transaction, or deed placed in motion 
by an individual or legal entity.”  Virginia v. Sebelius, No. 3:10-cv-00188-HEH, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130814, at *37-38 (E.D. Va. Dec. 13, 2010). 
If allowed to stand, the individual mandate would collapse the traditional 
distinction between acts and omissions by characterizing a failure to act as a 
“decision” not to act—thereby transforming inactivity into activity by linguistic 
alchemy.  It would also then collapse the distinction between economic and non-
economic activity by characterizing an activity as “economic” not based on the 
type of activity it is but on whether it has any economic effect.  Since any activity, 
in the aggregate, can be said to have an economic effect, the line the Court drew 
between activity that Congress can reach and that which is outside its powers 
would be destroyed.  The government’s novel theory would end our scheme of 
limited and enumerated powers, as well as erase the long-held constitutional 
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 distinction “between what is truly national and what is truly local.”  Lopez, 514 
U.S. at 567-68 (citing NLRB, 301 U.S. at 30).  All of this transgresses the current 
state of Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clause doctrine. 
 
II. The Individual Mandate Cannot be Justified as an “Essential Part of 
a Broader Regulatory Scheme” because Congress Cannot Regulate 
Inactivity 
 
Unable to directly justify the individual mandate under existing Commerce 
Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause doctrine (let alone the fallback taxing 
power theories that we do not confront here), the government has resorted to a new 
theory: that the Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes Congress to mandate 
economic activity when doing so is an essential part of a broader regulatory 
scheme.  That is, while not itself a regulation of interstate commerce, nor a 
regulation of intrastate economic activity, nor even a regulation of intrastate 
noneconomic activity, an economic mandate is a necessary and proper means of 
exercising the lawful ends of regulating the interstate health insurance industry.   
The government’s proposed theory that Congress may mandate economic 
activity rests on a sentence of dictum from Lopez and a concurring opinion by 
Justice Scalia in Raich that identify circumstances when Congress may reach 
wholly intrastate noneconomic activity.  Even if such a doctrine is someday 
accepted by a majority of the Supreme Court, these two sources speak only of the 
regulation of activity not inactivity.  Indeed, in his opinion in Raich, Justice Scalia 
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 uses the word “activity” or “activities” 42 times.  See Jason Mazzone, Can 
Congress Force You to Be Healthy? N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 2010, at A39.   
In Lopez, the Court referred to reaching intrastate noneconomic activity 
when doing so is “an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in 
which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were 
regulated.”  514 U.S. at 561 (emphasis added).  In Raich, Justice Scalia proposed 
that “Congress may regulate even noneconomic local activity if that regulation is a 
necessary part of a more general regulation of interstate commerce.” 545 U.S. at 37 
(emphasis added).  Neither formulation extends to the regulation of inactivity and 
there is good reason to doubt that he would ever extend his proposed doctrine so 
far.  For Scalia is the Justice who referred to the Necessary and Proper Clause as 
“the last, best hope of those who defend ultra vires congressional action.”  Printz v. 
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923 (1997) (Scalia, J.). 
 If and when a majority of the Court does accept Justice Scalia’s “essential to 
a broader regulatory scheme” rationale for reaching intrastate noneconomic 
activity, some doctrine limiting “necessity” under this theory will be required.  The 
distinction between economic and noneconomic activity would obviously provide 
no limit to this doctrine.  The whole purpose for his concurring opinion was to 
question the usefulness of that distinction in dealing with the problems posed by 
Raich.  Without some judicially administrable limiting doctrine, however, the fear 
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 expressed in Lopez and Morrison that Congress would then possess a general 
police power would be realized. 
  The distinction between activity and inactivity provides the same type of 
judicially administrable limiting doctrine for what is “necessary” to execute the 
commerce power under an “essential to a broader regulatory scheme” theory as the 
economic/non-economic distinction provides for the substantial effects doctrine.  
Now that Congress has, for the first time, sought to reach inactivity, all the 
Supreme Court need do is look back at its previous substantial effects doctrine 
cases, as it did in Lopez, to see that every case decided until now involved the 
regulation of activity, not inactivity. 
  Limiting Congress to regulating or prohibiting activity under both the 
“substantial effects” and the “essential to a broader regulatory scheme” doctrines 
would serve the same purpose as the economic/non-economic distinction.  Such a 
formal limitation would help assure that exercises of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause to execute the commerce power would be truly incidental to that power and 
not remote.  Doing nothing at all involves not entering into a literally infinite set of 
economic transactions.  Giving a discretionary power over this set to Congress 
when it deems it essential to a regulation of interstate commerce would give 
Congress a plenary and unlimited police power over inaction that is typically far 
remote from interstate commerce.  However imperfect, some such line must be 
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 drawn to preserve Article I’s scheme of limited and enumerated powers.  Because 
accepting the government’s theory in this case would effectively demolish that 
scheme, the government’s theory is unconstitutional. 
  And the government implicitly acknowledged that problem in its previous 
briefs, in attempting to distinguish the health insurance business as “unique” in a 
variety of respects and thereby appear to be providing a limiting principle.  Defs.’ 
Response to Pls’. Mot. Prelim. Inj. and Br. Supp. at 24 n.10, Thomas More Law 
Center v. Obama, 720 F. Supp.2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (No. 10-11156); Defs.’ 
Surreply to Pls.’ Mot. Prelim. Inj. and Br. Supp. at 11-12, Thomas More Law 
Center v. Obama, 720 F. Supp.2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (No. 10-11156).  But 
examining the substance of the law in question is precisely the sort of inquiry into 
the “more or less necessity” of a measure that has been rejected by the Supreme 
Court since McCulloch.  Once the power to mandate economic activity is 
recognized here, the Court will refuse to examine future mandates on a case-by-
case basis to see if they are factually similar to the health insurance mandate.  
Therefore, if this mandate is allowed to stand, Congress will henceforth have the 
discretionary power to impose mandates at its discretion regardless of the 
“uniqueness” of the market in question.  The government’s attempt to limit the 
doctrine by its factual assertions is chimerical. 
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 III. The Individual Mandate Constitutes a “Commandeering of the 
People” That Is Not “Proper” Under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause 
 
The Supreme Court, in two novel cases presenting theretofore 
unprecedented assertions of power under the Commerce Clause, has stated that 
Congress cannot use this power to mandate or “commandeer” state legislatures and 
executive officers.  Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).  As Justice Scalia explained, doing so would 
be “fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual 
sovereignty,” and therefore improper under our federalist system. Printz, 521 U.S. 
at 935.  In Printz, Justice Scalia pointed to the Tenth Amendment as the source of 
“residual state sovereignty” in a constitutional system that confers upon Congress 
“not all governmental powers, but only discrete, enumerated ones.”  Id. at 919 
(citing U.S. Const. amend. X).  He then elaborated that the mandate at issue, even 
if necessary, could not be justified under the Necessary and Proper Clause: “When 
a ‘la[w]…for carrying into Execution’ the Commerce Clause violates the principle 
of state sovereignty reflected in” the Tenth Amendment and other constitutional 
provisions, “it is not a ‘La[w] . . . proper for carrying into execution the Commerce 
Clause.’” Id. at 923-24 (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18) (emphasis added). 
Just as mandating that states take action is improper commandeering, so too 
is mandating that individual citizens enter into transactions with private companies 
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 an improper commandeering of the people.  See generally, Barnett, supra, at 27-
42.  The Tenth Amendment reads:  “The powers not delegated by the Constitution 
to the United States, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states 
respectively, or to the people.”  U.S. Const. amend. X (emphasis added).  In this 
way, the text of the Tenth Amendment protects not just state sovereignty, but also 
popular sovereignty.   
Chief Justice John Jay affirmed the priority of popular sovereignty in the 
first great constitutional case before the Supreme Court, Chisholm v. Georgia, 
noting that the “sovereignty of the nation is in the people of the nation, and the 
residuary sovereignty of each State in the people of each state,” as the people were 
“truly the sovereigns of the country.”  2 U.S. (Dall.) 419, 471-72 (1793).  Fellow 
Founder James Wilson agreed, recognizing that sovereignty starts with the 
individual citizen:  “If one free man, an original sovereign, may do all this; why 
may not an aggregate of free men, a collection of original sovereigns, do this 
likewise?”  Id. at 456 (emphasis added).  Although the Eleventh Amendment 
reversed the outcome of Chisholm and the Supreme Court has interpreted that 
Amendment as establishing state sovereignty, the Court has never repudiated the 
priority of popular sovereignty.  See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) 
(“in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of 
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 government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all 
government exists and acts.”). 
Just as the Constitution disallows the “commandeering” of states as a means 
of regulating interstate commerce, thus so too does it bar a commandeering of the 
people for this purpose.  Various express provisions of the Constitution reflect this 
anti-commandeering principle.  For example, persons may not be mandated to 
quarter soldiers in their homes in time of peace, U.S. Const. amend. III, to testify 
against themselves, id., amend. V, or to labor for another, id., amend. XIII.   
What very few mandates are imposed on the people by the federal 
government all rest on the fundamental pre-existing duties that citizens owe that 
government.  Such are the duties to register for the draft and serve in the armed 
forces if called, to sit on a federal jury, and to file a tax return.  See, e.g., Selective 
Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 378 (1918) (relying on the “supreme and noble 
duty of contributing to the defense of the rights and honor of the nation” to reject a 
claim founded on the Thirteenth Amendment).  In the United States, there is not 
even a duty to vote.  So there is certainly no comparable pre-existing “supreme and 
noble duty” to engage in economic activity when doing so is convenient to the 
regulation of interstate commerce. 
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 There are also pragmatic reasons to believe that the individual mandate is 
not “proper.”  In New York v. United States, Justice O’Connor explained that 
mandates on states are improper because, “where the Federal Government directs 
the States to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public 
disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may 
remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision.”  505 U.S. 144, 
169 (1992).  That proposition applies to the commandeering of individuals as well: 
the individual mandate has allowed Congress and the president to escape political 
accountability for increasing taxes on persons making less than $250,000 per year 
by compelling them to make payments directly to private companies.  It is the 
evasion of that accountability that explains why the mandate was formulated as a 
regulatory “requirement” enforced by a monetary “penalty.”   
The individual mandate crosses a fundamental line between limited 
constitutional government and limitless power cabined only by the vagaries of 
political will—which is to say, not cabined at all.  If the word “proper” is to be 
more than dead letter, it at least means that acts which destroy the very purpose of 
Article I—to enumerate and therefore limit the powers of Congress—are improper.  
If the federal power to enact “economic mandates” were upheld here, Congress 
would be free to require anything of the citizenry so long as it was in the name of a 
comprehensive regulatory plan.  Unsupported by any fundamental, preexisting, or 
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 traditional duty of citizenship, imposing “economic mandates” on the people is 
improper, both in the lay and constitutional senses of that word.  Allowing 
Congress to exercise such power would turn “citizens” into “subjects.” 
 
IV. The Inactivity/Activity Distinction, Like the Economic/Non-
Economic Distinction, Provides a Judicially Administrable Line By 
Which Some Laws Are Deemed Too Remote From the Commerce 
Power—and Thus Resists Making Congress’s Enumerated Powers 
into a Plenary Police Power  
 
  The analysis offered above demonstrates both the extensions and limits that 
the Necessary and Proper Clause creates when applied to the Commerce Clause. 
The limits to the Necessary and Proper Clause, most recently expressed in Lopez 
and Morrison, are part of a long tradition in which judicially administrable limits 
are given to the Clause in order to maintain limited and enumerated powers of 
Congress within a federal system.  
A. The Supreme Court Has Always Resisted Any Ruling that Would 
Give Congress Plenary Power 
  
  Although the history of Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause 
jurisprudence does not provide a consistent interpretation of the clauses, there is 
one rule that has remained constant throughout: “we always have rejected readings 
of the Commerce Clause and the scope of federal power that would permit 
Congress to exercise a police power; our cases are quire clear that there are real 
limits to federal power.”  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring).  These 
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 limits to federal power do not solely derive from the political process. From 
McCulloch onward, the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses have never 
been held non-justiciable and left completely to congressional discretion.  The 
inquiry begins with the determination that an activity “fits somewhere along a 
causal chain of federal powers,” but does not end there. United States v. Comstock, 
130 S. Ct. 1949, 1966 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. 
at 566). “The inferences must be controlled by some limitations lest, as Thomas 
Jefferson warned, congressional powers become completely unbounded by linking 
one power to another ad infinitum in a veritable game of ‘‘this is the house that 
Jack built.’’” Id. (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Livingston 
(Apr. 30, 1800), 31 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 547 (B. Oberg ed. 2004)).2 
  It is worth asking, therefore, whether some test can be devised to distinguish 
a constitutionally permissible form of mandated activity from a constitutionally 
impermissible form. In other words, would the health insurance mandate, if 
allowed to stand, permit any future limitation on congressional power?  
  The government argues, essentially, that not purchasing health care is a 
particularly pernicious type of inactivity upon which the entire fee-shifting edifice 
                                                 
2 Kennedy also here advocated enhanced scrutiny, beyond a mere rational-basis 
test, of the connection between means and ends when considering claims of power 
under the Commerce Clause.  Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1967 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring).  This clarification strongly signals that his joining the majority in 
Raich did not represent an abandonment of his prior stance in Lopez.  Lopez, 514 
U.S. at 569 (Kennedy, J., concurring).   
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 of providing health care is built.  Thus, in the aggregate, the effects of allowing 
individuals to opt out of the system are particularly dire.  
  Such logic may be sound given the complex legislation that Congress chose 
to pass, but if so then it is undoubtedly true of many if not all markets.  There are 
an infinite number of things that everyone is not doing right now, many of which 
might have an effect on health.  Making everyone do those things—from 
purchasing orthopedic shoes to joining a gym—would undoubtedly have 
substantial effects on interstate commerce.  Indeed, diet and exercise have a greater 
effect on health care outcomes than ownership of a health insurance policy.  See, 
e.g., Barak D. Richman, Behavioral Economics and Health Policy: Understanding 
Medicaid's Failure, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 705, 718 (citing Victor R. Fuchs, Who 
Shall Live? Health, Economics, and Social Choice at 54-55 (1998)), 725 (2005). 
  If upheld, therefore, the individual mandate would usher in a new era of 
constitutional jurisprudence in which either (a) courts review every congressional 
action to determine whether a particular law is more or less necessary and proper, 
an inquiry which it has traditionally rejected because it would encroach upon 
Congress’s authority to make policy decisions for the areas over which its power 
duly extends; or, (b) there are no longer any checks on congressional power 
outside the political process and claims under the Necessary and Proper Clause 
become non-justiciable “political questions.”  
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   Either choice would fly in the face of constitutional precedent, history, and 
philosophy—the letter and spirit of our founding document. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) at 421.  In order to maintain meaningful and justiciable limits on federal 
power, the Supreme Court has always articulated limiting principles.   With the 
individual mandate, Congress has not only bootstrapped its own power—by 
creating a scheme that requires an unprecedented economic mandate—it has used 
that same strap to pull every American from passive inactivity into some form of 
action.  As the Court has expressed time and again, the Constitution “does not 
tolerate reasoning that would ‘convert congressional authority under the 
Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States.”  
Raich, 545 U.S. at 45 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567). 
B. A Judicially Administrable Limiting Principle on Congressional 
Power Has Always Been An Essential Part of Commerce Clause and 
Necessary and Proper Clause Jurisprudence 
 
The demand for an articulable limit to federal power is not a mere linguistic 
contrivance or a plaintive recourse to the nullification and “states rights” theories 
obviated by the Civil War.  Rather, such limiting principles are essential to the 
very concept of federalism.  In an integrated national system in which goods, ideas, 
and people flow freely across state borders, anything can be realistically construed 
to have an effect on interstate commerce.  And, in the aggregate, those effects 
 25
 could certainly be substantial.  Arguments based on these effects, such as the 
government’s here, have salience precisely because such effects do exist. 
Given the obviousness of such effects to both the Framers and modern 
interpreters, and given the concept of an enumerated and limited federal 
government, the mere substantial effects of an intrastate economic activity cannot 
be, and is not, the only test for constitutionality.  The need to be able to articulate a 
limiting principle is as much an aspect of Necessary and Proper Clause 
jurisprudence as those principles that have enlarged the scope of congressional 
power.  If we only ask how a particular provision augments congressional power 
and not how it limits that same power, then we are examining only half of one of 
the foundational tenets in constitutional jurisprudence.  Cf. The Federalist No.  51, 
at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“In framing a government 
which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you 
must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place 
oblige it to control itself.”). 
   Nobody disputes that the market for health care is an important one and that 
people’s decisions on whether to buy health insurance (and if so in what form) 
affects the economy.  Instead the issue is how the document that is the font of all of 
Congress’s legitimate authority limits federal power.  The Constitution does so, 
among other structural mechanisms, by granting Congress a finite set of 
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 enumerated powers.  As Chief Justice Marshall wrote in the foundational 
Commerce Clause case of Gibbons v. Ogden, “The enumeration presupposes 
something not enumerated.”  22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 195. 
During oral arguments in Gibbons, Daniel Webster conceded that “the words 
used in the constitution, ‘to regulate commerce,’ are so very general and extensive, 
that they might be construed to cover a vast field of legislation,” and thus the 
words “must have a reasonable construction, and the power should be considered 
as exclusively vested in Congress so far, and so far only, as the nature of the power 
requires.”  Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 14. 
In the context of the Commerce Clause, the Framers adopted the limiting 
principle that Congress’ regulatory authority reached only physical items that 
crossed state lines and did not reach local agriculture and manufacture. See Lopez, 
514 U.S. at 585-87 (Thomas, J., concurring); Randy Barnett, The Original 
Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 101 (2001); Randy Barnett, 
New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 55 Ark. L. Rev. 
847 (2003).  They did so “despite being well aware that agriculture, manufacturing, 
and other matters substantially affected commerce.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 591 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
In the context of the Necessary and Proper Clause executing that same 
commerce power, McCulloch v. Maryland provided a limiting principle distinct 
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 from the “more or less utility” standard disfavored by the Framers for unduly 
interfering with congressional discretion over policy matters.  During oral 
arguments in McCulloch, the attorney for Maryland offered a fascinating argument 
that thematically mirrors the one now offered by the government.  Needing to 
overcome the clear problem that the challenged bank of the United States was the 
second such bank—with the first having been presumptively constitutional—
Joseph Hopkinson argued that a national bank, once a necessity, was no longer 
needed: “a power growing out of a necessity which may not be permanent, may 
also not be permanent. It has relation to circumstances which change; in a state of 
things which may exist at one period, and not at another . . . [W]hatever might 
have been the truth and force of the bank argument in 1791, they were wholly 
wanting in 1816.” McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 333.  In contrast, Chief Justice 
Marshall in both McCulloch and his defense of that case as “A Friend to the 
Constitution” proposed a means/end test that did not require judges to evaluate a 
given law’s relative necessity or utility.   
By claiming that “health care is special” and that the unique features of the 
health care market justify the individual mandate, however, the government asks 
courts to weigh the “more or less necessity or utility” of the new health care law.  
In doing so, it ignores the unprecedented nature of the individual mandate and, 
instead, offers a long-discarded method of constitutional interpretation.  
 28
 Striking down the individual mandate requires no such tortuous calculations, 
and it would affect no other law ever enacted by Congress. The Court in 
McCulloch rightly rejected Maryland’s arguments and chose, instead, to fashion a 
test that respected congressional prerogative while drawing a judicially 
administrable line beyond which congressional power did not reach.  Then, as now, 
“the task is to identify a mode of analysis that allows Congress to regulate more 
than nothing (by declining to reduce each case to its litigants) and less than 
everything (by declining to let Congress set the terms of analysis).”  Raich, 545 
U.S at 47-48 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  
 
CONCLUSION 
For the first time in American history, the federal government has attempted  
to “commandeer the people” by imposing on them an “economic mandate.”  Such 
economic mandates cannot be justified by existing Supreme Court doctrines 
defining and limiting the powers of Congress.  Upholding the power to impose 
economic mandates “would fundamentally alter the relationship of the federal 
government to the states and the people; nobody would ever again be able to claim 
plausibly that the Constitution limits federal power.”  Ilya Shapiro, State Suits 
Against Health Reform Are Well Grounded In Law—And Pose Serious Challenges, 
29 Health Affairs 1229, 1232 (June 2010).  It would turn citizens into subjects. 
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As the first court considering a constitutional challenge to the individual 
mandate recognized last summer, “[n]ever before has the Commerce Clause and 
the associated Necessary and Proper Clause been extended this far.”  Virginia v. 
Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 612 (E.D. Va. 2010).  Only the Supreme Court is 
empowered to reconsider the outer bounds of federal power under the Commerce 
and Necessary and Proper Clauses, and the district court erred in going beyond 
existing doctrinal limits in this area.  Accordingly, amici respectfully request this 
Court to reverse the district court and remand the case for further proceedings. 
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